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INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the definition provided by Albrecht et al. (2007), frauds and corruptions “are cancers 
that eat away at society’s productivity”, given that they reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of 
economies. Among all the frauds, financial statement frauds are the most costly, regarding both the 
amount deceived compared to other frauds and their consequences. In fact, the detection of a 
financial statement fraud implies the decline of the firm value on the market and the loss of 
revenues for the company itself. Moreover, the whole market will suffer the reaction of the 
investors who will start being less trustful towards the market and, as a consequence, the 
companies will have more difficulties in obtaining the financial resources needed to develop or can 
access to these financial resources only at a higher cost (Lev, 2003).  
Aiming to find some ways to prevent frauds, researchers have started to analyse the factors that are 
related to them, in order to implement preventive actions and mechanisms to avoid, or at least 
reduce, the possibility of the fraud occurrence (Albrecht et al., 2007; Bar-Gill and Bebchuck, 
2003; Hemray, 2004; Lev, 2003; Rezaee, 2002). Specifically, a large part of the international 
literature has begun to focus the attention towards the relationship between some mechanisms of 
corporate governance and the fraud occurrence (Caplan, 1999; Beasley et al., 2000; Young, 2001), 
considering the role of corporate governance mechanisms to solve governance problems and 
exercise a control function over the different actors of the firm (Dey, 2008).  
Even though many corporate governance mechanisms were taken into consideration regarding 
their relation with financial statement frauds by different studies in literature over the past years, to 
our knowledge, no empirical studies considered the whole set of corporate governance 
mechanisms in relation with financial statement fraud (Corporate Governance Indexes including a 
numerous variety of governance features were build by some authors to test their impact on 
performance, see Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2004; Larcker et al., 2007). Due to 
these reasons, the base line of this work is the relationship between financial statement frauds and 
corporate governance as a whole. This relation will be analyzed within the agency theory 
theoretical framework (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
Eisenhart, 1989; Demsky, 2003) and within the conflicts of interests problems, arising among 
different actors of the firms in those realities not characterized by the separation between owner 
and manager (evidence of different corporate governance systems); in both the two contexts some 
figures can benefit of information asymmetry to achieve their personal aims (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Dennis and McConnell, 2003; Dey, 2008). We argue that the agency problems, when high and 
made worse by a weak corporate governance of the firm, as well as conflicts among the main 
stakeholders of a firm, end up in fraudulent behaviour by those who can take advantage of 
information asymmetry and gain personal benefits from them. Thus, the financial statement fraud 
is the result of high agency problems and high conflicts of interests not solved by the company. 
According to the previous considerations, this research is organized around three main research 
questions: is the relationship between Corporate Governance and Financial Statement Frauds 
influenced by different corporate governance systems? Which is the impact of the corporate 
governance on financial statement frauds? Do the different dimensions of corporate governance 
have different impact on financial statement frauds?  
 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The system of corporate governance adopted by the firms depends on different variables connected 
to the national, regional and cultural differences, the ownership structure, the industry and the 
market environment, the size and the structure of the firm, the CEO tenure, the attributes and 
background (Huse, 2005). Thus, on the international scenario, it is possible to find numerous kinds 
of corporate governance systems, but in our analysis, following the contribution of Barker (2009), 
only two different types of corporate governance systems will be considered, the “Shareholder 
Model” and the “Blockholder Model”. The first one is predominant in the Anglo-American 
countries, while the second one is the most diffused in Europe and Asia (Coffee, 2001).  
The characteristics of the Shareholder Model rely on the dispersed ownership which makes the 
shareholders passive actors, with no active control over the management. Thus, in this context, the 
main corporate governance problem relies on the conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders, reflecting the agency issues arising from dispersed company ownership, which is 
solved, through some mechanisms such as the managerial compensation system, the market for 
managers and the market for corporate control (Berle and Means, 1982; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Ricketts, 1987).  
On the contrary, the characteristics of the Blockholder Model rely on the presence of a 
concentrated ownership, a limited role played by the stock market, and the low level of disclosure 
required by the law. The ownership and control are in the hand of cohesive groups of insiders that 
know each other and who have long-term stable relationships with the firm through investments, 
family interests, industrial concerns and so on; in this scenario, the insider groups control the 
management closely and the agency problem typical of the outsider systems is not evident here (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Nestor and Thompson, 2000). Thus, the concentrated ownership seems to lead 
to an “equity agency conflict” between the dominant shareholders and the minority shareholders 
(La Porta et al., 1998; Denis and McConnell, 2003), instead of a typical agency problem. 
Companies accomplish these corporate governances systems rely more on the application of codes 
of good corporate governance and relationships with main stakeholders rather than external control 
mechanisms to solve their agency problems.  
The analysis of the two types of corporate governance systems finds its reason in the consideration 
that the corporate governance structure should help in the mitigation of the agency conflicts (Dey, 
2008). Following this idea, a significant part of the literature suggests the presence of a link 
between frauds occurrence and corporate governance. To investigate on it, it seems necessary the 
specification of the different forms, mechanisms, and instruments that take part in the whole 
corporate governance existing in the firm. For example, Beasley (1996) analyzes the relationship 
between financial frauds and the board composition, finding higher percentages of outside 
directors for no-fraud firms, compared to fraud ones. Similarly, Uzun et al. (2004) suggest that the 
board composition and the structure of a board’s oversight committee are correlated with the fraud 
occurrence. Beasley et al. (2000) find a positive correlation between corporate governance 
mechanisms’ differences and frauds in different industries. 
Many other studies analyse fraud occurrence in relation with some mechanisms of corporate 
governance; for example, Faber (2005) links it with the board and the audit committee 
characteristics; Dechow et al. (1996) connect frauds with board features; Peng and Roell (2006), 
Erickson et al. (2006) associate the fraud occurrence with the executive compensation system.  
Even though many corporate governance mechanisms were taken into consideration regarding 
their relation with financial statement frauds, to our knowledge, no empirical studies considered 
the whole set of corporate governance mechanisms in relation with financial statement fraud. In 
other words, even if a quite developed analysis on a numerous variety of governance features has 
been already conducted in the last years, the main significant applications of it are addressed to 
explain the impact on firm’s performance. According to this aim, in fact, some authors built some 
useful indexes representative of the level of the corporate governance of the firm (Gompers et al., 
2003; Larcker et al., 2007).  
Due to these considerations, the first aim of this work is to understand if a particular type of 
governance model can be connected mostly to a fraud occurrence; the second aim of this 
dissertation relies on the exploitation of the Corporate Governance construct in order to analyse 
the relationship with financial statement frauds. Finally, the third aim is to investigate on the 
impact of the different governance mechanisms considering all of them simultaneously, to take 
into account the possible correlation among them.  
Specifically, these goals have been studied through the lens of the agency theory theoretical 
framework (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Eisenhart, 1989; 
Demsky, 2003) and within the conflicts of interests’ problems, arising among different actors of 
the firms not characterized by the separation between the ownership and the management.  
 
 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
The first analysis of this dissertation relies on the relation between the type of governance system 
adopted by the firm and the financial statement fraud. Specifically, we posit that the information 
asymmetry and the excess of power, detained by controlling shareholders, “allow” these subjects 
to easily elude controls and achieve personal gains, committing frauds in the worst cases. Thus, we 
argue that the likelihood of committing a fraud and the magnitude of the occurred fraud will be 
higher for companies belonging to the Blockholder corporate governance models, due to the fact 
that the conflict of interests arising in these contexts can lead to higher level of fraudulent 
behaviours committed by those who can benefit of information asymmetry. This leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
HP1: Compared to Shareholder models, Blockholder corporate governance models 
lead to a higher level of likelihood of occurrence and to a higher level of magnitude of 
financial statement fraud. 
We expect a positive relation between the Blockholder corporate governance system and the 
financial statement fraud.  
 
Further, this work wants to investigate the role of the whole corporate governance on both the 
occurrence and the level of the fraud. Specifically, we consider the overall corporate governance 
structure that a firm has in order to understand whether there is a link with the financial statement 
fraud occurrence or not, and, if there is, which is the impact of governance on fraud magnitude.  
Considering the function that corporate governance should have on solving the agency problems, 
especially controlling for the executive bodies of the company (Dey, 2008), we posit that a good 
level of governance of the firm, should lead to better behaviour of those actors who could take 
advantage of the information asymmetry and gain personal benefit at the expense of those who 
have no direct control and management power in the firm. If the opportunistic behaviour of the 
manager or of the controlling shareholder have the chance to take place and this leads to a fraud 
occurrence, we argue that the level of the fraud will be higher when the governance system of the 
firms is weak, due to the fact that the fraudulent behaviours can be implemented more easily in 
absence of adequate governance mechanisms and procedure controlling for them. This leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
HP2: The lower the corporate governance quality of a firm, the higher the financial 
statement fraud occurrence and level will be. 
We expect a negative relation between the corporate governance as a whole, measured through 
the Corporate Governance Index built as “good”, and the likelihood of fraud occurrence and also 
the level of financial statement frauds. In other words, if the Corporate Governance Index is low, 
the likelihood of fraud will be higher; as well, if the Corporate Governance Index is low, the 
magnitude of fraud will be higher. Thus, we expect that the overall corporate governance has a 
positive impact on financial statement fraud, reducing its level. 
 
As previously mentioned, the impact of various mechanisms of governance on the fraud 
occurrence has been studied in many researches over the years, but, to our knowledge, no research 
has focused its attention on the impact of the governance mechanisms on the level of the frauds. 
We argue that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be analyzed singularly. Some 
mechanisms, that are apparently unrelated, can be connected, directly or indirectly and, on our 
opinion, they can impact differently on the fraud occurrence and on the fraud level. Thus, we argue 
a deeper and more complex study on how the different corporate governance mechanisms interact 
is needed, in order to analyse the factors that determine more frequently the fraud occurrence and 
its magnitude, and, consequently, understand the eventual actions to implement to avoid or, at 
least, prevent frauds. Therefore, the third purpose of this work is to provide an analysis of the role 
of corporate governance mechanisms on financial statement fraud, considering simultaneously all 
the governance mechanisms particularly relevant according to the reviewed literature (Board of 
Directors features and rules, CEO and Executives characteristics, the compensation system for top 
management, the audit committee features, and the external auditors): 
HP3: Different corporate governance mechanisms have different impacts on financial 
statement fraud occurrence and level. 
Consistent with prior studies on corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2003; Dey, 2008; Larcker, 
2007; Brown and Caylor, 2008), we have no expectations on the single governance mechanisms’ 
impact on fraud. Testing this hypothesis, we will be able to understand the impact on the financial 
statement fraud occurrence and magnitude of each mechanism. It is necessary to specific one more 
time that these mechanisms are viewed not as atomistic elements, but as components of a more 
complex corporate governance construct. 
 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
To test the hypotheses, a longitudinal analysis, covering 14 years (1992-2005), is conducted on a 
sample of 214 listed fraud firms, constructed as a choice-based sample of 107 fraud and 107 no-
fraud firms.  
Specifically, the fraud firm sample includes financial statement fraud cases, occurred in US, 
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Netherlands, Russia, Ireland, and 
Sweden. Concerning the US fraud firms, the data are taken from the database of fraud firms 
provided by the Authors of the “Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007”, a research 
commissioned by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO). In this study instances of fraudulent financial reporting, alleged by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), 
were analyzed. As far as the European context is concerned, we built up our own database, 
collecting the information available on the “Loss and Litigation Report” published by GenRe in 
2005, that examines the press articles on detected financial statement frauds and sums up the main 
information about the type of fraud specifying, in some cases, the amount deceived through the 
fraudulent behaviour. Moreover, to enrich our database, we looked also at some National 
Authorities in charge of the detection and the sanction of frauds. These Authorities, in fact, to give 
a report about their annual activities, publish some documents concerning fraudulent firms.  
For each fraud firm, the overstatement, as documented by the SEC (in the AAERs) or the 
overstatement as reported in the available public documents of the company, was considered, 
taking into account the magnitude of the fraud. Moreover, for the US companies included in the 
sample, corporate governance data were taken from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
database, from the Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database, and from the single corporate 
governance reports of the firms. For all the other companies of the sample, the governance data 
were taken from the Osiris database and from the Bloomberg website, or hand collected from each 
specific National Authority for the Stock Exchange Market. Where those data were not provided 
or insufficient for our analysis, the individual company documents and reports were analysed to 
complete the fulfilment of the data by hand collection. 
Concerning the financial data, the DATASTREAM database was used to collect information for 
all the firms included in the sample of our analysis.  
After the data collection, we conducted the statistical analysis to test the hypothesis of the work, 
where the dependent variable (FRAUD) is represented by the financial statement fraud.  
Prior researches, testing the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
frauds, used to consider the fraud as a dichotomous variable, equal to 1 when the fraud occurred, 0 
otherwise (Beasley, 1996; Erickson et al, 2005). On our opinion, this method can be inappropriate 
for our analysis due to the fact that different magnitude of the fraud can take place. The dimension 
of the fraud has to be captured, considering that a larger fraud has a greater negative impact on the 
market and causes higher damages to its “victims”. Including the dimension aspect in the variable 
FRAUD allows us to measure the impact of corporate governance at the different levels of the 
fraud, and highlights the governance mechanisms that affect most the largest frauds. Thus, in our 
analysis, the first step is connected to the calculation – for each firm – of the level of the fraud 
(LEVEL). This has been determined by the ratio between the amount deceived through the fraud 
and the total assets of the firm. This method seems to be appropriate to standardize the values of 
the variable and make them statistically significant and comparable. 
After the standardization procedure, we create four ranges (No fraud, Low, Medium and High 
amount of fraud), representing four level of fraud occurrence. The ranges are expressed on a scale 
of numbers and each firm belongs to one of them, depending on the fraud level committed. In sum, 
the dependent variable FRAUD is equal to 0, 1, 2 or 3, as follows: 
- No Fraud (equal to 0): all the firms of the matched sample which did not commit any fraud are 
coded as 0; 
- Low Level of fraud (equal to 1): firms with a LEVEL between 0 (non included) and 5% 
included;  
- Medium Level of fraud (equal to 2) firms with a LEVEL between 5 (not included) and 30% 
included;  
- High Level of fraud (equal to 3), firms with a LEVEL higher than 30%. 
 
A Corporate Governance Index (CGI) is constructed, after running a PCA analysis, in order to 
reduce the number of governance variables. The CGI represents the corporate governance as a 
whole and it is useful to test the incidence of the corporate governance of the firm on the fraud 
occurrence and level. The CGI has the aim to capture all the corporate governance aspects of a 
firm. Here we propose a new methodology to build the CGI. First, we classify the corporate 
governance variables, previously considered, into binary records, following the Browns and 
Caylor’s (2006) approach, we coded as 1 if the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) or the 
literature consider the firm’s governance variable minimally acceptable, 0 otherwise. Once this 
classification has been made, the next step consists in the codification of the governance 
dimensions coming from the PCA into binary records. Each dimension, if half or more of the 
individual governance factors included in it are coded as 1, is be coded as 1, meaning that it can be 
considered a dimension with a governance level minimally acceptable. If less than half of its 
individual governance factors are coded with 1, the dimension’s code is 0, indicating that 
dimension does not support the minimally acceptable governance standard, indicated by the ISS or 
by the literature. The codes’ sum of all the dimensions determines the CGI of the firm. 
 
To test the hypotheses of research, we use a multinomial logistic regression model on a cross-
sectional analysis. The model captures the effect of the independent variables on the likelihood of 
the fraud occurrence and on the level of the fraud itself, controlling for other variables and 
comparing the fraud firms with the no-fraud firms, through the presence of the matching sample. 
In this way, we can control for the no-fraud firms and the fraud firms at the same time, not 
affecting the results concerning the factors that contributed to generate the fraud.  
All the independent variables are measured in the year before the year of the fraud occurrence to 
have reliable data not affected by the fraud situation. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results of the applied model are divided in three different sections for each regression. Here, we 
give the main points of each regression. 
 
HP1 RESULTS 
The model, as a whole, is statistically significant (p-value for the chi-square equals to 0.0000). The 
Wald chi-square statistic is equal to 79.41. 
The results, in every case of level of fraud, demonstrate that the presence of a Blockholder increases 
the likelihood of committing a fraud and also the level. Thus, the first hypothesis is verified at all 
levels of fraud. The control variables help in the analysis of the factors which act as enhancing 
factors or reducing factors of the fraud occurrence and magnitude. In all the three cases, the 
percentage of shares owned by the directors acts as a reducing factor on the dependent variable, 
confirming the previous results achieved by the literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Moreover, it seems that the most relevant and common factors which induce to commit frauds are 
the pressure of the market and the level of debt detained. The pressure of the market creates 
expectations on the firms, so the company, in order to accomplish the growth trend achieved in the 
past, tends to commit frauds to deceive its stakeholders. Thus we can conclude affirming that the 
higher is the growth rate, the higher the likelihood and level of the fraud occurrence. This is 
particularly true for the cases of low and high level of fraud. A firm with a great pressure from the 
market about its growth expectation will commit a low fraud if its situation is not perfectly in line 
with the expectations, probably hoping to refit the situation the following year. On the opposite, the 
firm will be induced to commit a high fraud if the overall situation differs enormously from the 
expectation of the market, knowing that no other legal way could make the firm able to maintain its 
position on the market.  
The level of debt, as well, induces the firms to commit a fraud in order to show positive results or a 
better financial situation which can reflect an overall more positive situation to reassure the market 
and the investors. The level of debt seems to affect mostly the likelihood and level of fraud for low 
and medium voluntary misstatements, while for high level of fraud it does not appear a relevant 
indicator. 
Another relevant element from the results is the profitability of the company which is shown as a 
deterrent to commit fraud. If the firm has a good profitability, the willing to commit a voluntary 
misstatement will be reduced. This is true for firms committing a medium level of fraud, but not in 
the other two cases. An explanation to this can be found in the fact that a high profitability does not 
reduce the willing in case the fraud is committed by the Blockholder to achieve high personal gains 
(high level of fraud) and that a high profitability is not the determinant factor to stop the 
Blockholders to commit fraud when other factors, like the market pressure and the level of debt, 
affect the company situation. 
To summarize all the previously considerations about the first regression, a table is presented. 
  Robust Predicted
      FRAUD      Coef.   Std. Err.    z    P>|z|           [95% Conf. Interval] Relation
1 - low Level of Fraud (FRAUD = 1)
       BLOCK |    2.28651   .6053124     3.78   0.000     ***        1.10012    3.472901 +
    MNGT OWN |  -2.762466   1.463106    -1.89   0.059       *      -5.630102    .1051699 -
      RESTAT |   .529004   .6614014      0.80   0.424              -.7673189    1.825327 +
         ROE |  -.0062205   .0113409    -0.55   0.583              -.0284482    .0160072 -
     FIN LEV |   .2094676   .1131973     1.85   0.064       *       -.012395    .4313302 +
       SALES |  -1.39e-09   1.57e-09    -0.88   0.376              -4.48e-09    1.69e-09 -
      GROWTH |   .2794954   .1437753     1.94   0.052       *      -.0022989    .5612898 +
        TIME |   1.419674   1.173625     1.21   0.226              -.8805885    3.719936 -
    COUNTRY1 |   -.898715   1.341352    -0.67   0.503              -3.527717    1.730287 none
    COUNTRY2 |   .6138075   .7271967     0.84   0.399              -.8114718    2.039087 none
       _cons |  -2.387395   .4498329    -5.31   0.000              -3.269052   -1.505739
2 - Medium Level of Fraud (FRAUD = 2)
       BLOCK |   1.495301   .4573552     3.27   0.001      **       .5989009      2.3917 +
    MNGT OWN |  -.6936721   .2932308    -2.37   0.018      **      -1.268394   -.1189503 -
      RESTAT |   .6697167   .6708025     1.00   0.318              -.6450321    1.984465 +
         ROE |  -.0275691   .0103514    -2.66   0.008      **      -.0478575   -.0072808 -
     FIN LEV |   .0227764   .0083013     2.74   0.006      **       .0065061    .0390467 +
       SALES |  -5.72e-10   7.76e-10    -0.74   0.461              -2.09e-09    9.48e-10 -
      GROWTH |   .1413409   .1342995     1.05   0.293              -.1218814    .4045631 +
        TIME |  -.0718984     .73897    -0.10   0.922              -1.520253    1.376456 -
    COUNTRY1 |  -2.145638   .6482773    -3.31   0.001      **      -3.416238   -.8750374 none
    COUNTRY2 |  -1.152613   .8739193    -1.32   0.187              -2.865464     .560237 none
       _cons |  -.7663473   .2676504    -2.86   0.004      **      -1.290932   -.2417621
3 - High Level of Fraud (FRAUD = 3)
       BLOCK |   1.523744   .4336249     3.51   0.000     ***       .6738546    2.373633 +
    MNGT OWN |  -.7083276   .2325069    -3.05   0.002      **      -1.164033   -.2526224 -
      RESTAT |   .5930144   .5475498     1.08   0.279              -.4801634    1.666192 +
         ROE |  -.0019895    .009623    -0.21   0.836              -.0208502    .0168713 -
     FIN LEV |   .0777055   .0657983     1.18   0.238              -.0512568    .2066677 +
       SALES |  -1.20e-09   7.21e-10    -1.67   0.095       *      -.0285447     .530258 -
      GROWTH |   .2508566   .1425543     1.76   0.078      **      -.0285447     .530258 +
        TIME |  -.6913614   .7019543    -0.98   0.325              -2.067166    .6844437 -
    COUNTRY1 |   .0044726   .6635315     0.01   0.995              -1.296025     1.30497 none
    COUNTRY2 |   .0031269   .6103743     0.01   0.996              -1.193185    1.199439 none
       _cons |   -1.42678    .315166    -4.53   0.000     ***      -2.044494   -.8090657
(fraud=0 is the base outcome)
TABLE 14
FRAUDt = α + β1BLOCKt-1 + β2MNGT OWNt-1 + β3RESTATt-1 + β4ROEt-1 + β5FIN LEVt-1 + β6SALESt-1 
+ β7GROWTHt-1 + β8TIMEt-1 + β9COUNTRY1t-1 + β10COUNTRY2t-1 + ε
Regression Results HP1
The effect of the Corporate Governance system on the fraud
 
0.1555
0.0000
214
* low 0.1
** medium 0.05
*** high 0.001
0.001<x<=0.05
x<=0.001
Pseudo R
2
Chi square
Number of observations
Statistically significance
0,05<x<=0.1
 
 
HP2 RESULTS 
The model multinomial logistic regression launched is statistically significant (p-value for the chi-
square equals to 0.0000). The Wald chi-square statistic is equal to 96.26. 
The results in every case of level of fraud demonstrate that a good corporate governance of the firm 
reduces the likelihood of fraud occurrence and its magnitude. Thus, the second hypothesis is 
verified at all levels of fraud. The control variables help in the analysis of the factors which act as 
enhancing factors or reducing factors of the fraud occurrence and magnitude. In all the three cases, 
the presence of a Blockholder increases the likelihood of fraud occurrence and its magnitude 
confirming the results of the first hypothesis. The percentage of shares owned by the directors acts 
as a reducing factor on the dependent variable, confirming the previous results achieved by the 
literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and also confirming the results found with the first 
hypothesis. 
Moreover, it seems that the most relevant and common factors which induce to commit frauds are 
almost the same found testing the first hypothesis. In fact, the pressure of the market impacts mostly 
on the firms’ behaviour in cases of low and high level of fraud; the level of debt seems to affect 
mostly the firms’ behaviour in case of low and medium voluntary misstatements, while for high 
level of fraud it does not appear a relevant indicator. 
As well, the profitability of the company acts as a deterrent to commit fraud in case of medium 
level of fraud, but not in the other two cases, as in the first hypothesis results.  
Thus we can conclude that adding the variable corporate governance enhances the analysis on the 
fraud, because it represents another variable, not correlated with the other variables already 
included in the model, which explains another factor. In other words, through this analysis, we 
found another element with a direct impact on the fraud occurrence and level.  
To summarize all the previously considerations about the first regression, a table is presented. 
 
Predicted
      FRAUD      Coef.   Std. Err.    z    P>|z|           [95% Conf. Interval] Relation
1 - low Level of Fraud (FRAUD = 1)
         CGI |  -.4616854    .214396    -2.15   0.031      **      -.8818938    -.041477 -
       BLOCK |   2.461442   .6108266     4.03   0.000     ***       1.264244     3.65864 +
    MNGT OWN |  -2.814011   1.517923    -1.85   0.064       *      -5.789086    .1610632 -
      RESTAT |   .4668858   .7103791     0.66   0.511              -.9254316    1.859203 +
         ROE    -.0068855   .0107472    -0.64   0.522              -.0279495    .0141786 -
     FIN LEV |   .2283281   .1114475     2.05   0.040      **        .009895    .4467612 +
       SALES |  -1.60e-09   2.37e-09    -0.68   0.498              -6.24e-09    3.03e-09 -
      GROWTH |   .2954124   .1542263     1.92   0.055       *      -.0068655    .5976904 +
        TIME |   1.145353   1.285481     0.89   0.373              -1.374143    3.664849 -
    COUNTRY1 |   -.8447193   1.399102    -0.60   0.546             -3.586908      1.8974 none
    COUNTRY2 |    .4612127   .7013815     0.66   0.511             -.9134697    1.835895 none
       _cons |   -.3401406   1.099204    -0.31   0.757             -2.494541     1.81426
2 - Medium Level of Fraud (FRAUD = 2)
         CGI |  -.6674772    .171425    -3.89   0.000     ***      -1.003464   -.3314903 -
       BLOCK |   1.789057   .4717136     3.79   0.000     ***       .8645151    2.713599 +
    MNGT OWN |  -.6527979   .2824173    -2.31   0.021      **      -1.206326   -.0992701 -
      RESTAT |   .5631513   .7161831     0.79   0.432              -.8405418    1.966844 +
         ROE |  -.0307515   .0113662    -2.71   0.007      **      -.0530289   -.0084742 -
     FIN LEV |   .0243218   .0088565     2.75   0.006      **       .0069635    .0416801 +
       SALES |  -4.72e-10   8.75e-10    -0.54   0.590              -2.19e-09    1.24e-09 -
      GROWTH |   .1441895   .1439395     1.00   0.316              -.1379268    .4263058 +
        TIME |  -.4203173    .766229    -0.55   0.583              -1.922099    1.081464 -
    COUNTRY1 |  -2.249354   .7042263    -3.19   0.001      **      -3.629612   -.8690959 none
    COUNTRY2 |  -1.471958   .9201863    -1.60   0.110              -3.27549    .3315744 none
       _cons |   2.139642   .8053742     2.66   0.008      **      .5611374    3.718146
3 - High Level of Fraud (FRAUD = 3)
         CGI |  -.6892808   .1946503    -3.54   0.000     ***      -1.070788   -.3077732 -
       BLOCK |   1.827674   .4534438     4.03   0.000     ***       .9389406    2.716408 +
    MNGT OWN |  -.7151164   .2415463    -2.96   0.003      **      -1.188538   -.2416944 -
      RESTAT |   .4248202   .5731221     0.74   0.459              -.6984786    1.548119 +
         ROE |  -.0025404   .0094135    -0.27   0.787              -.0209906    .0159098 -
     FIN LEV |   .1040493   .0715404     1.45   0.146              -.0361673    .2442659 +
       SALES |  -1.20e-09   7.40e-10    -1.63   0.104              -2.65e-09    2.46e-10 -
      GROWTH |   .2682859   .1529532     1.75   0.079      **       -.031497    .5680687 +
        TIME |  -1.286336   .7958334    -1.62   0.106              -2.846141    .2734684 -
    COUNTRY1 |   .1665213   .7512167     0.22   0.825              -1.305836    1.638879 none
    COUNTRY2    -.3077283   .5607489    -0.55   0.583              -1.406776    .7913194 none
       _cons |    1.52464    .849501     1.79   0.073      **      -.1403512    3.189631
(fraud=0 is the base outcome)
The effect of the Corporate Governance on the fraud likelihood and magnitude
FRAUDt = α + β1CGIt-1 + β2BLOCKt-1 + β3MNGT OWNt-1 + β4RESTATt-1 + β5ROEt-1 + β6FIN LEVt-1 + 
β7SALESt-1 + β8GROWTHt-1 + β9TIMEt-1 + β10COUNTRY1t-1 + β11COUNTRY2t-1 + ε
Regression Results HP2
TABLE 18
  Robust
 
* low
** medium
*** high
Pseudo R
2
0.001<x<=0.05
x<=0.001
Chi square
Number of observations
Statistically significance
0.1976
0.0000
214
0.1
0.05
0.001
0,05<x<=0.1
 
HP3 RESULTS 
The model, as a whole, is statistically significant (p-value for the chi-square equals to 0.0000). The 
Wald chi-square statistic is equal to 166.34. We remind that in this model the governance 
mechanisms have been transformed in artificial variables, called “Dimensions” through the PCA 
analysis. 
The results in every case of level of fraud demonstrate that there are some aspects of corporate 
governance particularly relevant for the fraud occurrence and also for the fraud magnitude. The 
results suggest taking into account mostly the independence of the Board, element which reduces 
the likelihood and the level of the fraud. These results are in line with previous findings, given by 
the literature (Beasley, 1996; Uzun et al., 1994; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Hermalin and 
Weishbach, 2002). Moreover, also concerning the Board independence, but referring specifically to 
the Audit Committee, the presence of a financial expert seems to help at reducing the fraud 
phenomena, result aligned with previous researches (Jensen, 1993; Agraval and Chada, 2005). 
Moreover, Board decisions on CEO compensation type and amount seems to affect, as well, the 
fraud occurrence and level. The results in the three cases we analysed suggest that these kinds of 
decisions should be taken considering that a high level of variable compensation and a high level of 
stock options do not lead the CEO to perform better, but induce him/her to have fraudulent 
behaviour and gain from them personal benefits. These findings are aligned with the studies of 
Erickson et al. (2006), Bruner, McKee and Santore (2005), and Peng and Roell (2006). 
The CEO duality, as demonstrated by previous researches, negatively affects the amount of fraud 
and the likelihood of fraud occurrence (Yermack, 1996; Sharma, 2004). Thus, the results in three 
cases confirm the previous findings of the literature. 
The fact that the Board size and ID are both positively correlated confirms previous studies: the 
higher is the number of Board members, the lower the efficiency of the Board (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). At the same time, the higher is the number of interlocking 
directorships in the Board, the higher the likelihood of fraud and its level, an evidence of corporate 
governance underlined by the Institutional Shareholders Service, which considers the presence of 
numerous ID within a Board as a negative element of corporate governance. Thus, the results 
empirically confirm the theory on the topic. 
In sum, also the third hypothesis is verified at all levels of the fraud. The control variables help in 
the analysis of the factors which act as enhancing factors or reducing factors of the fraud occurrence 
and magnitude. In all the three cases, as in the previous two hypotheses’ results, the presence of a 
Blockholder increases the likelihood of fraud occurrence and its magnitude, confirming the results 
of the first and second hypotheses. The percentage of shares owned by the directors acts as a 
reducing factor on the dependent variable, confirming the previous results achieved by the literature 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The level of debt affects as well the likelihood and magnitude of 
fraud, increasing them, at all the levels of the fraud, low, medium and high. 
As found in the other results relative to the first and the second hypothesis, the profitability of the 
company acts as a deterrent to commit fraud in case of medium level of fraud, but not in the other 
two cases. 
The two new results, achieved testing the third hypothesis, are relative to the TIME and RESTAT 
control variables, which seem to have a role on the fraud, respectively a decreasing effect and an 
increasing effect. Thus, first we can conclude that the reforms actuated after the major financial 
scandals actually have a positive effect at reducing fraud occurrence and magnitude in case of 
medium and high level of fraud. Moreover, we suggest taking into account, during the fraud 
detection process, the presence of a restatement, because, considering the achieved results, 
restatements could be considered as a red flag in fraud detection.  
Analysing more in depth the principal aspect of corporate governance allows us to understand 
which factors should be taken particularly into account in order to avoid the fraud occurrence and in 
case the occurrence is not avoided at least obstacle the amount of fraud that could be deceived. 
To summarize all the previously considerations about the first regression, a table is presented. 
 
Predicted
      FRAUD      Coef.   Std. Err.    z    P>|z|           [95% Conf. Interval] Relation
1 - low Level of Fraud (FRAUD = 1)
        DIM1 |  -1.222772   .2526516    -4.84   0.000     ***      -1.717961   -.7275844 -
        DIM2 |  -.3152572   .3032299    -1.04   0.298              -.9095768    .2790624 -
        DIM3 |   .9045984   .4520253     2.00   0.045      **       .0186451    1.790552 +
        DIM4 |   .7012997   .3445182     2.04   0.042      **       .0260564    1.376543 +
        DIM5 |   .8308868    .303894     2.73   0.006      **       .2352656    1.426508 +
        DIM6 |  -.2856668   .3529778    -0.81   0.418              -.9774906    .4061569 +
        DIM7 |  -.5509121   .3925402    -1.40   0.160              -1.320277    .2184526 -
       BLOCK |   2.530054   .8629104     2.93   0.003      **       .8387803    4.221327 +
    MNGT OWN |  -1.655488   .9277085    -1.78   0.074       *      -3.473763    .1627872 -
      RESTAT |   .2482153    .678569     0.37   0.715              -1.081756    1.578186 +
         ROE |   .0019507   .0121622     0.16   0.873              -.0218868    .0257882 -
     FIN LEV |   .2233059   .1260758     1.77   0.077       *      -.0237982    .4704099 +
       SALES |  -1.24e-09   1.20e-09    -1.03   0.302              -3.58e-09    1.11e-09 -
      GROWTH |   .1780905   .1051353     1.69   0.090       *       -.027971    .3841519 +
        TIME |   1.273454   1.319938     0.96   0.335              -1.313576    3.860485 -
    COUNTRY1 |  -2.017404   1.677035    -1.20   0.229              -5.304332    1.269524 none
    COUNTRY2 |   .3893158   .7659069     0.51   0.611              -1.111834    1.890466 none
       _cons |  -2.193563   .6198733    -3.54   0.000     ***      -3.408492   -.9786338
  Robust
TABLE 22
Regression Results HP3
The effect of Corporate Governance Dimensions on fraud
FRAUDt = α + β1DIM1t-1 + β2DIM2t-1 + β3DIM3t-1 + β4DIM4t-1 + β5DIM5t-1 + β6DIM6t-1 + β7DIM7t-1 + 
β8BLOCKt-1 + β9MNGT OWNt-1 + β10RESTATt-1 + β11ROEt-1 + β12FIN LEVt-1 + β13SALESt-1 + β14GROWTHt-1 
+ β15TIMEt-1 + β16COUNTRY1t-1 + β17COUNTRY2t-1 + ε
 
2 - Medium Level of Fraud (FRAUD = 2)
        DIM1 |  -1.295951   .2181528    -5.94   0.000     ***      -1.723523   -.8683798 -
        DIM2 |   .1539994   .2728747     0.56   0.573              -.3808252     .688824 -
        DIM3 |   .9123902   .4426596     2.06   0.039      **       .0447933    1.779987 +
        DIM4 |   1.171873     .38815     3.02   0.003      **       .4111133    1.932633 +
        DIM5 |   .7466292   .2677725     2.79   0.005      **       .2218047    1.271454 +
        DIM6 |   -.505626   .3367086    -1.50   0.133              -1.165563    .1543108 +
        DIM7 |   .0288106   .3848808     0.07   0.940              -.7255419     .783163 -
       BLOCK |   1.845959   .5892508     3.13   0.002      **       .6910486    3.000869 +
    MNGT OWN |  -.5562197   .2943081    -1.89   0.059      **      -1.133053    .0206137 -
      RESTAT |    .935421   .7383925     1.27   0.205              -.5118017    2.382644 +
         ROE |  -.0256586   .0120426    -2.13   0.033      **      -.0492618   -.0020555 -
     FIN LEV |   .0529857   .0112776     4.70   0.000     ***        .030882    .0750894 +
       SALES |  -1.97e-09   6.32e-09    -0.31   0.755              -1.44e-08    1.04e-08 -
      GROWTH |   .0383083    .118835     0.32   0.747              -.1946041    .2712207 +
        TIME |  -1.643967   .9986872    -1.65   0.100       *      -3.601358    .3134236 -
    COUNTRY1 |  -2.443525    .852093    -2.87   0.004      **      -4.113597   -.7734539 none
    COUNTRY2 |  -1.637088   1.216133    -1.35   0.178              -4.020665    .7464893 none
       _cons |  -.4646007   .3993055    -1.16   0.245              -1.247225    .3180237
3 - High Level of Fraud (FRAUD = 3)
        DIM1 |  -1.358728   .2267434    -5.99   0.000     ***      -1.803137   -.9143191 -
        DIM2 |   .1570821   .2130811     0.74   0.461              -.2605491    .5747133 -
        DIM3 |   .7759135   .4429354     1.75   0.080       *      -.0922239    1.644051 +
        DIM4 |   1.081278   .3236144     3.34   0.001      **        .447005     1.71555 +
        DIM5 |   .7015164   .3024852     2.32   0.020      **       .1086564    1.294376 +
        DIM6 |  -.3398046   .3287145    -1.03   0.301              -.9840731    .3044639 +
        DIM7 |  -.4998664   .3611429    -1.38   0.166              -1.207693    .2079607 -
       BLOCK |   1.662972   .5976164     2.78   0.005      **       .4916652    2.834278 +
    MNGT OWN |  -.5826786    .242554    -2.40   0.016      **      -1.058076   -.1072814 -
      RESTAT |   1.013337   .5714033     1.77   0.076       *      -.1065925    2.133267 +
         ROE |   .0028037   .0103881     0.27   0.787              -.0175567     .023164 -
     FIN LEV |   .1284471   .0773989     1.66   0.097       *      -.0232519    .2801461 +
       SALES |  -1.27e-09   9.87e-10    -1.28   0.200              -3.20e-09    6.69e-10 -
      GROWTH |   .1529706   .1052105     1.45   0.146              -.0532382    .3591794 +
        TIME |  -1.773574   .9992282    -1.77   0.076       *      -3.732025    .1848775 -
    COUNTRY1 |  -.6686325    .963893    -0.69   0.488              -2.557828    1.220563 none
    COUNTRY2 |  -.9016163    .807832    -1.12   0.264              -2.484938    .6817054 none
       _cons |  -1.040758   .4247107    -2.45   0.014      **      -1.873175   -.2083401
(fraud=0 is the base outcome)
0.3967
0.0000
214
* low 0.1
** medium 0.05
*** high 0.001
Pseudo R
2
Chi square
Number of observations
Statistically significance
0,05<x<=0.1
0.001<x<=0.05
x<=0.001  
 
 
  
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The work we developed on the corporate governance of the firm, aimed to understand which factors 
mostly affect the fraud occurrence and magnitude.  
The analysis provides us with some important results which enhance the literature on this topic and 
which have also managerial implications. In our opinion, the main contributions of this work rely 
on the findings about the corporate governance system and also about the main aspects of corporate 
governance which should be taken into account in managing the firm. 
 
From the analysis it emerged that, as predicted in the first hypothesis, belonging to a Blockholder 
model system of corporate governance could increase the probabilities to face a fraud occurrence 
and its magnitude. We confirmed this hypothesis by also testing the other two hypotheses. Matter-
of-factly, the presence of the Blockholder always played as an enhancing factor of the fraud. The 
originality of these findings relies on the fact that no previous works empirically tested this relation. 
Nevertheless, the obtained result needs some deeper and more accurate remarks: even if the 
Blockholder model is characterized by the presence of conflict of interests between the majority 
shareholder and the minority shareholders, belonging to this kind of corporate governance model 
does not necessarily imply a fraud occurrence. In fact, a lot of firms operate and experience 
successful growth in this type of context. However, the analysis we conducted suggests that, in 
order to improve the model, some preventing devices should be implemented to avoid, or at least 
reduce, the possibility of frauds occurrence. Beside the legislations of each specific country, the 
firms themselves could focus their attention on some aspects of the corporate governance that can 
help to increasing the probability of preventing frauds.  
 
Moreover, from the empirical findings we highlight that the corporate governance as a whole has a 
role at reducing the fraud occurrence and magnitude (evidence provided by the hypothesis 2). After 
the most relevant financial crises (such as the Asian one of 1997-1998, the actual crisis started in 
2007 and still continuing that has affected almost all countries in the world, and, in addition to 
those, the speculative bubble of 2000 which led many companies to bankruptcy), academics and 
practitioners have started to question the role of the corporate governance in the firm, doubting if a 
good corporate governance could impact positively at reducing the damages produced by the 
contingency situation. On the crest of the emotions generated by the recent crisis situation, some 
authors (Erkens, Hung and Matos, 2010) accused and pointed a finger towards the corporate 
governance of the firms, sustaining that even good corporate governance did not produce any effect 
and did not lead the companies to perform or behave better. To support their ideas, these Authors 
presented some significant examples, such as the Lehman Brothers’ one that, despite its commonly 
recognized good corporate governance, experienced one of the most relevant bankruptcies of the 
last decades. In spite of the empirical evidences, nowadays it seems reasonable to affirm that only 
with a good level of corporate governance the conflict of interests among the different actors of the 
firms can be reduced, assuring fairness and control of the management. In other words, a good 
governance is needed to monitor over the management behaviors, as claimed also by the reformers, 
such as Nell Minow, who states that the “need for corporate governance has never been clearer or 
more pressing” (The Economist, Oct. 2010). 
 
Investigating more in depth the factors that mostly affect the fraud occurrence and its level, we 
evidenced the most relevant aspects of corporate governance useful to assure a wealthy 
management of the company (evidences provided by the hypothesis 3). 
The results showed that a particular attention has to be addressed to the Board of Directors and its 
Committees, more specifically to some issues of the Board.  
The independence of the Board seems to be a necessary condition to assure the effectiveness of this 
body, as pointed out also by previous literature. The problem emerges more and more in the 
common debate, conducted from both the theoretical and practitioners points of view. For example, 
recently, The Economist (Oct. 2010) states that companies need “independent directors to keep a 
watchful eye on managers”, underling the importance of this board feature considering the financial 
scandals occurred in the last decades.  
Also the composition of the Board, concerning the number of Board members and the presence of a 
financial expert in the audit committee, results relevant to have a good quality of corporate 
governance. In fact, a high number of members on the Board could have the only effect to lower the 
effectiveness of this body. At the same time, the presence of a financial expert can assure a better 
quality of the Board’s work and a deeper control on the management’s duties. These findings 
confirm previous studies, where the big size of the Board was pointed out as being a factor that 
reduces the Board’s efficiency and, on the contrary, the presence of a financial expert has been seen 
as an enhancing factor of the quality of the Board’s controls. 
As far as the Board’s decisions about the CEO compensation are concerned, the results highlight 
how these decisions should be taken considering that a high level of stock options and, more in 
general, a high portion of variable compensation negatively impact on the CEO behaviors, inducing 
him/her to pursue personal benefits, committing, in the worst cases, frauds. This result is also 
aligned with the findings of previous literature on the same topic. 
In conclusion, we can state that firms should pay attention to some specific aspects of the corporate 
governance in order to reduce the possibility of facing a fraud or, at least, to reduce the magnitude 
of the fraud. This statement is valid both for the companies operating in a Blockholder system and 
companies operating in a Shareholder system of corporate governance, even though firms belonging 
to a Blockholder model should pay more attention to the aforementioned aspects considering that 
their likelihood to commit a fraud is higher than the one of the companies belonging to a 
Shareholder model. 
These findings can be considered as an important contribution to the literature on the topic, given 
the normative indications they provide for academic, who want to further investigate on these 
issues, and practitioners, who aim to improve the effectiveness of their businesses. 
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCHES  
 
The analysis we conducted can be considered as a first step for literature that investigates the role of 
corporate governance as a whole on financial statement fraud, because as previously said, to our 
knowledge, no preceding studies tested the relations we analyzed. Notwithstanding, even if the 
work presents some significant suggestions for the improvement of the analysis on the fraud 
occurrence and prevention, some limitations can be traced as a starting point of further researches.  
A first limit this work presents relies on the fact that we did not consider the type of Blockholder. In 
other words, we did not investigate on the nature of the majority owners of the company 
(management, institutions, pension funds, etc.). Further researches could focus on this aspect to 
understand if the fraud can be associated with a particular type of Blockholder or not. Specifically, a 
particular attention should be paid to the situation in which the Blockholder is detained by the 
directors (that means that no other subject holds a higher portion of shares). This particular aspect 
should be analyzed more in depth in order to understand what portion of shares, detained by the 
directors, constitutes a deterrent to commit fraud, as demonstrated by our results, and, on the 
contrary, after what level it acts as an enhancing factor of the fraud. This consideration arises 
looking at the descriptive statistics: the fraud firms, in fact, show a median value of ownership 
detained by directors equal to 0.08, while the no-fraud firms have a median value of this variable 
equal to 0.10.  
A second limit to our work is connected to the variety of the sample adopted, concerning the 
nationalities of the firms. In fact, the sample included companies belonging to 11 selected countries. 
This implies that 11 different cultural and institutional contexts were compared. The choice of these 
countries was determined by the will of taking into consideration the main realities that reflect the 
two types of corporate governance systems. Conscious of the numerous differences traceable 
among these countries, from various points of view, we controlled for the most relevant variables 
which could reflect these differences, but some aspects, such as the fraud detection policies and the 
specific legislation of each country, could not be monitored thoroughly. Thus, further researches 
could focus on single countries, in order to have results referring to a single specific cultural and 
institutional context. On the contrary, a broader analysis, considering more than 11 countries could 
be implemented to have a worldwide comparison of results. 
A third limit this work presents relies on the fact that the sample on which we tested our hypotheses 
was composed by 107 fraud firms and 107 no-fraud matched firms, due to the difficulties in 
findings enough data on the financial statement frauds. Thus, further studies could conduct the 
analysis on a broader sample. 
Finally, our analysis did not specify the techniques used to implement the fraud. So, further 
researches could analyze if particular kinds of frauds are associated with the presence of a 
Blockholder. 
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